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Abstract 
Most water for agricultural and municipal uses comes from river basins. Traditionally the 
analysis of trade-offs has been confined to evaluating the marginal value of water in urban and 
municipal uses. However, return flows from these uses often end up in coastal waters that 
support downstream shrimp and other fish habitats. We examine this problem by developing a 
conceptual model of a river basin with multiple uses. We develop equilibrium conditions for 
water allocation to these alternative uses. A unique feature of this model is that the demand for 
water may vary due to exogenous conditions, such as drought. We apply this framework to 
secondary data from a coastal river basin in Georgia to show that only under very unique 
conditions may this trade-off become meaningful, i.e., upstream water withdrawals may need to 
be limited to protect downstream benefits. 
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Water Management in a River Basin with Downstream Externalities 
 
1. Introduction 
A universal problem faced by water managers is the tradeoff between competing uses. In 
particular, freshwater is withdrawn for meeting urban and agricultural demands, and the runoff 
back into the basin is often loaded with pollutants. In times of drought, the withdrawals may 
increase, leading to a lower residual stock of water in the river basin. In many cases, the residual 
water in the river basin has positive economic value, either because it is used to support 
downstream environmental habitats such as estuaries and coastal fisheries or the water is used to 
generate electricity. In this paper we consider this problem and apply it to examine water 
allocation in a selected coastal river basin in the southeastern United States. In the example we 
have in mind, the water in the river basin is used to support downstream fish habitats and it is 
expected that with a decline in the quantity of water available in the river or an increase in 
pollutant loads, there will be a negative effect on fish production downstream in the estuary.  
 
In years with relatively high rainfall, the demand for agricultural water is expected to be 
relatively low. Hence less water may be withdrawn from the river and returned to the basin. 
However, in times of drought, there is likely to be low rainfall and therefore a higher demand for 
agricultural water. This triggers an increase in water withdrawals from the river. Thus, if the 
benefits from the stock of river water downstream do not change with rainfall, then it is likely 
that there is a higher competition for water during drought years relative to when rainfall is high. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework that models this problem and 
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through an empirical illustration, determine the set of parameter values under which there may 
be a case for reducing withdrawals in agriculture and preserving benefits in shrimp production. 
 
The problem defined above is an important one because coastal areas are generally densely 
populated, with a high municipal demand for water. In recent years, some of these areas, for 
example in the southeastern United States, have experienced tremendous settlement activity. 
Coupled with the traditional demand for water in farming, withdrawals from these river basins 
are often significant. However, the literature on the economics of water resources tends to focus 
on the issue of competing uses in these two sectors, while mostly neglecting the downstream 
externalities of water use. In situations where the marginal product of water in the upstream uses 
is relatively high, it may not be necessary to incorporate the downstream sector in a water 
allocation model. However, when downstream externalities have significant economic value, or 
there are regulatory decisions that force a minimum quantity and quality of residual water in the 
river basin, the standard allocation model may be too limiting.  
 
In what follows, we propose a conceptual model of water allocation that incorporates both the 
quantity and quality aspects of water allocation. We derive equilibrium conditions for the model 
that determine the rule for water allocation between sectors. We examine simple cases that 
typically reflect the conditions we examine in the empirical section. Finally, we illustrate the 
model by using secondary data from a coastal river basin in Georgia to show conditions under 
which downstream externalities may affect upstream water allocation. We find that for the 
plausible case examined here, the magnitude of downstream externalities is usually too small to 
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be considered explicitly.  However, further research may be necessary to quantify the link 
between water quality and quantity and the size of these down river externalities. 
 
Section 2 develops the theoretical model. Section 3 provides the empirical illustration. Section 4 
concludes the paper with some policy implications.  
 
2. The Theoretical Model 
Consider a river basin or a coastal estuary in which part of the available water is used for urban 
and agricultural demand, and the return flow accumulates downstream in the basin, which in turn 
supports a coastal fishing industry. This is a fairly common phenomena observed in most coastal 
river basins. Often the downstream benefits of river basin water may be higher in recreational 
uses (e.g., tourism) or both tourism and fishing may need to be considered but the basic 
conceptual framework modeled here is quite general. Let the initial stock of water in the basin be 
denoted byQ . This may represent the water entering this basin from the upstream reaches of the 
river. In times of drought, this Q  may acquire a low value. Let the inverse demand functions for 
agriculture and urban use be denoted respectively by Di-1(qi(R)), where i = a,u, which represent 
agriculture and urban water use, respectively.2 The variable qi(R) represents the amount of water 
withdrawn for use i, which may vary from season to season. This variable is endogenous in our 
model. It represents the aggregate water demanded in the agriculture or urban sector, inclusive of 
the amount of rainfall per unit area which is given by R. Our focus is in examining water demand 
in years with inadequate rainfall when the value of R may be low, and comparing it to a normal 
rainfall year. Right now we preserve this general notation but later we will assume for simplicity 
                                                 
2 We do not consider industrial demand mainly because as we will see later, for the purposes of the theoretical 
model, it is sufficient to have two demands, and adding a third does not provide any new insights. 
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that urban demand does not change with rainfall. Demand is downward sloping, i.e., ∂Di-1/∂qi <0. 
A higher rainfall R implies a lower demand, conversely, demand for water is higher in a drought 
year, i.e., ∂Di-1/∂R<0. Let the recharge coefficients from each of these demands be denoted by αi, 
with uaii ,,10 =≤≤α . That is, a proportion αi of the water withdrawals returns to the basin and 
the share (1- αi) is the net consumptive loss from the basin. Then the freshwater remaining in the 
basin after the water is withdrawn for the two uses defined by Q1 is given by  
 
0
,
1 ≥−= ∑
= uai
iqQQ .         (1) 
 
That is, aggregate withdrawals can not exceed the volume of water in the basin. Ideally (1) 
should be a strict inequality, suggesting that there must be some water left in the basin after 
withdrawals, but the weak inequality should not make a major difference. Note that even if only 
one of the recharge rates is strictly positive, there will always be water in the basin after 
recharge. Further downstream of this location, the flow in the basin is augmented by the return 
flows from the two sectors. Using (1), the total amount of water in the basin then becomes   
 
uuaauuaa qqQqqQ )1()1(1 αααα −−−−=++ .     (2) 
 
The quality of the water returning from each of these demands is likely to be lower than the 
quality of the initial withdrawal from the basin. Let the water quality of the return flow from 
each sector be denote by hi, i=a,u. That is hi may be thought of as the pollutant concentration in 
the return flow in parts per million (ppm). Again for simplicity, we only consider one pollutant, 
and assume that both sectors emit only that pollutant. Alternatively this may be the same index 
 6
of pollutants. Assume that the initial pollutant concentration in the basin is zero. Then from (2), 
the pollutant load after water withdrawals and recharge is given by  
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The numerator in the above equation gives the aggregate pollution in the basin (volume of water 
in each “use” times the pollution concentration) and the denominator is the aggregate quantity of 
water in the basin after recharge water is returned. Let us define this quantity of water as Q2. The 
variable h thus gives the final pollutant load in the basin after recharge from the two sectors.  
 
Differentiating (1) and using the definition of Q2 we get 
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where i≠j. It is clear that increased withdrawals will always lead to a higher pollution 
concentration or lower quality of water. The first term in the numerator is always positive – it 
represents the direct effect of the marginal unit withdrawn for use in sector i on the quality of the 
water in the basin. It implies that when an additional unit of water is withdrawn, it always 
increases the pollution concentration in the basin. The second term in square brackets represents 
the effect of a unit of water withdrawn in sector i on pollution through changes in the aggregate 
stock. This effect is also positive. For simplicity, suppose ,0=aα i.e., the recharge rate for 
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agriculture is zero. Then the first term is zero, i.e., since there is no recharge, there is no direct 
effect of a unit withdrawn on the pollution in the basin. Moreover, the second square bracketed 
term in the numerator is reduced to hjqjαj, which implies that the effect on the aggregate water in 
the river is only through the water withdrawn for the urban sector. So with zero recharge, water 
withdrawals only affect the pollution because they deplete the freshwater stock in the basin. One 
interesting insight is that the net effect of the water withdrawn does not depend on the relative 
pollution rates of the two sectors. That is, suppose the urban sector was much more pollution 
intensive than the agriculture sector, hu>ha, even then a unit withdrawn for agriculture will not 
improve the pollution in the river, as can be easily seen from equation (4).  
 
Next we specify the downstream effects of the quantity and quality of water in the basin. There 
are two variables that determine the propagation and resulting production of shrimp in the 
estuary - the quantity of residual water in the basin and the pollutant load. We assume that the 
population of shrimp is an increasing concave function of the level of water Q2 after all the 
runoff has returned to the basin. It is also a decreasing convex function of the pollution 
concentration in the basin h. That is, the higher the level of water, the higher the production of 
shrimp, but the benefit of additional water declines with more water. Similarly, the higher the 
pollution concentration, the lower the production and the damage declines steeply with an 
increase in pollution. The benefit function for shrimp is then given by B(Q2,h), with B′(Q2)>0, 
B″(Q2)<0, B′(h)<0, B″(h)>0. For convenience, the function B is assumed separable in its 
arguments so that the cross partial BQ2h=0. That is, there are no interactive effects between 
salinity levels and the volume of water in the basin. In reality little is known regarding the 
interactive effects of the two variables. Most biologists suggest that both salinity and freshwater 
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levels are important for the production of shrimp, but the joint effects of these two variables is 
not clear (personal communication, R. Lee, 2004).  
 
We first determine the optimal level of water withdrawals by agriculture and urban areas by 
maximizing the consumer plus producer surplus from the basin as follows: 
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subject to conditions (1) and (3). Then the Lagrangian for the problem is given by 
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The first order conditions are: 
 
uaidqBRqp ii ,,/))(( =∂−= λ         (5) 
 
where p(qi(R)) denotes the equilibrium price of water in sector i.  The objective function is 
concave so the first order conditions are also sufficient.  Suppose the constraint (1) is non-
binding, i.e., the gross aggregate water withdrawals are strictly lower than the water in the basin, 
which is quite plausible – the instantaneous flow in the river is usually much lower than the 
amounts withdrawn. Then λ=0, and (5) suggests that the marginal benefit of a unit of agriculture 
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water must equal the externality benefit from downstream water use in the fisheries sector. 
Expanding the right hand side of (5) using the definition of Q2 yields:  
 
uaidqdhhBQhQBRqp iii ,),/)(/(/),()1())(( 22 =∂∂−∂∂−+= αλ .   (6) 
 
Note that ∂B/∂Q2>0, ∂B/∂h<0 and dh/dqi>0. The left hand side of (6) represents the value of 
extracting a unit of water. The only benefit is in either agriculture or urban use. However the 
right hand side denotes the value of keeping water in the basin. This is composed of three 
factors: the shadow price of water in the basin λ, which is non-negative. The second term denotes 
the loss in shrimp production through a decline in water flows in the basin, from extracting a unit 
of water for agriculture. Since a factor (1-αi) of this withdrawal is lost permanently, this direct 
marginal benefit is multiplied by a fraction (1-αi). The third term on the right hand side is the 
effect of water withdrawals through increased pollution in the basin, which must be added to the 
other two. Thus the right hand side represents the aggregate benefit from keeping water in the 
basin. Water withdrawals create a positive externality through increasing the water level in the 
basin but impose a negative externality through increasing the pollution concentration.  
 
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium condition under two polar cases. Consider a year with average 
rainfall say R  and an extreme drought year with R=0. We assume that urban water use is 
independent of the amount of rainfall R, which may be reasonable if a significant proportion of 
water used in the urban sector is for household uses, and not say, for outdoor purposes. In that 
case, qu is a constant function of R, so we can omit R as an argument of qu. We plot the 
equilibrium condition for the agriculture sector. The demand for agriculture water in a normal 
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year is given by ))((1 RqD a− . This represents the left hand side of equation (6). Let us assume for 
now that λ=0. Then the top quadrant shows the marginal benefit of an unit of withdrawal 
because of a reduction in fresh water, MBQ2 which is equal to 22 /),()1( QhQBa ∂∂−α . In the 
bottom quadrant we plot the marginal benefit of a unit of water withdrawn through increase in 
pollution, given by )/(/),( 2 idqdhhhQB ∂∂ denoted by MBh. This is negative so its absolute value is 
plotted in the top quadrant. These two marginal benefit functions are summed as shown by the 
graph ∑MB . The intersection of this graph with demand gives us the optimal amount of water 
withdrawn in a year with rainfall R , indicated by )(* Rqa . However, in a drought year, rainfall 
R =0, so the inverse demand function for water ))0((1 aqD− shifts outwards, as shown by the graph 
since water demanded increases at any given price. The corresponding optimal amount of water 
also increases, given by )0(*aq . Thus withdrawals under drought increase ( )0(
*
aq > )(
* Rqa ) 
leading to a lower amount of water Q2 in the basin. What is not shown here is that if under 
drought, the initial stock of water in the basin is smaller, i.e, Q is lower, then that will only 
exacerbate the effect of the drought on the equilibrium water in the basin. The volume of water 
Q2 will be reduced further. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Let us now assume that agricultural water is purely for consumptive use, i.e., the recharge from 
agriculture αa =0. For instance, in the state of Georgia, agriculture is officially taken to be a 
purely consumptive use of water (EPD). Then how would that affect the equilibrium water 
allocation between sectors? The graph of MBQ2 will go up, since it will no longer be multiplied 
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by the fraction (1-αa) which equals 1. For the other graph MBh, from (4) we have on substituting 
αa =0, 
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It is likely that the effect of a zero recharge will result in more pollution. This is because there 
are two effects. On the one hand, lower recharge implies lower volumes of water and higher 
concentration, and on the other hand, a zero recharge means less pollution discharge from 
agriculture. The net effect is likely to be positive, which can be observed by differentiating (7) 
with respect to αa: 
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which is likely to be positive if Q2>>qi, i=a,u. Thus a zero recharge will shift up the ∑MB  
graph leading to a lower equilibrium value of *aq .  
 
Although we have modeled the downstream problem by specifying a benefit function, there may 
not be enough information on the relationship between water and pollution levels and the 
production of shrimp or other environmental amenities. In that case, a policy maker may regulate 
the basin by specifying a volume and pollution concentration at some exogenous level. The 
optimal allocation could then be implemented by a quota on the amount withdrawn, which can 
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be administered through issuing permits, or taxing users of water, where the tax is equal to the 
marginal externality cost at the optimum.  
  
3. An Empirical Application to Coastal Georgia 
We adapt the above conceptual framework to coastal Georgia, in particular the Ogeechee river 
basin, which falls between Savannah and Brunswick. This basin is chosen as it has the largest 
estuarial expanse of the five basins flowing into the Atlantic. Fig. 2 shows this basin among the 
other major coastal river basins in the state of Georgia.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
We collect data on agricultural demand for water under two situations – drought and when there 
is average rainfall. It is expected that water demand for agriculture will be higher under a 
drought situation than in the average rainfall case. We only look at three crops – peanuts, cotton 
and onions. These are major agricultural crops in the southeastern parts of Georgia. Data on the 
urban demand for water is estimated from a study done by Phyllis Isley (2003) at Georgia 
Southern University. The coefficients for agricultural and urban recharge are obtained from EPA 
and EPD studies. 
 
We determine the level of water withdrawals by the agriculture sector and the level of water 
inflow to the lagoon that equates the marginal value of water from urban and agricultural 
production to that of shrimp. For the purposes of this example, we only deal with the quantity of 
water and abstract from considering quality. This is because there is almost no data available on 
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the effect of quality on shrimp habitats, in particular, on the shrimp benefit function that relates 
the level of chemicals in the basin water to the downstream population of fish in the estuary. 
Although it is firmly established by biologists that shrimp need a certain amount of salt 
concentration in the river, but there is no quantification of this relationship. We leave the quality 
issue for future research. Similarly, we abstract from considering the water quality issue as well 
as the withdrawal of water for urban uses. In fact, the value for water is much higher in the urban 
sector reltive to farming, and as we find later, if the benefits from shrimp are a magnitude lower 
than for agriculture, the same will definitely be true for urban water use. Thus no major purpose 
may be served by considering urban water withdrawals from the Ogeechee river basin.  
 
For this study we consider only the surface permits, or those permits that withdraw water from 
rivers, streams, branches, creeks, ponds, tributary streams, drainage basins, natural lakes, 
artificial reservoirs, and ground water under direct influence of surface water. Table 1 shows the 
quantity of water permits by use and withdrawal source in the Ogeechee river basin, the location 
of which are shown in the map in Figure 3.    
 
[Table 1 here] 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
A brief explanation of the shrimp lifecycle is beneficial to understand the nature of the 
externality downstream of the river basin. Shrimp spawning normally occurs in the ocean near 
the shore up to several miles offshore in salinity levels of 25 to 65% (SCDNR 1997). Spawning 
correlates with the increase in bottom water temperatures of between 17 and 29 degrees C during 
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the spring (SAFMC 1999). The warm waters trigger spawning, and a rapid decline in water 
temperatures during the fall coincide with the end of the spawning season (Muncy 1984). In all 
species about 0.5 to 1 million eggs are discharged per spawn from each female (SCDNR 1997).  
After spawning, each species have eleven larval stages (5 nauplier, 3 protozoan, and 3 mysis) 
before developing into postlarvae. Duration of the larval periods is determined by temperature, 
food, and habitat. Most data suggest periods of 10-25 days depending on the shrimp type 
(SAFMC 1999). Natural mortality rates are very high for both larval and juvenile shrimp. 
Usually less than one or two percent of the eggs spawned survive to become adults. Of the 
shrimp that reach an adult size, most will die before they are eight or nine months old (SCDNR 
1997). 
  
Spawning begins in the spring and the postlarvae shrimp enter the estuaries shortly thereafter.  
Some species enter the estuaries as early as February. The crucial timing of fresh water inflows 
into the estuaries falls between February and August. Researchers do not fully understand how 
shrimp travel from ocean spawning areas to brackish water estuaries (SCDNR 1997). It is 
believed that shoreward countercurrents transport pink shrimp from ocean spawning areas to 
estuaries and nurseries (SAFMC 1999). During high tides the larvae become active, move up 
into the “water column,” and settle back down during ebb tides. This cycle moves the shrimp 
larvae farther inshore until they settle in creeks and marshes suitable for growth (SCDNR 1997).  
Growth while in the estuaries is very rapid and shrimp can grow 2 to 2.5 inches per month 
(SCDNR 1997). Salinity, temperature, density, and freshwater inflows are all thought to play 
major parts in the growth pattern of shrimp. Waters of high salinity, such as from irrigation 
appear to inhibit growth (SAFMC 1999, Muncy 1984).   
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“Fresh water inflow is the dominant factor influencing abundance, distribution, and growth of 
white shrimp,” (Muncy 1984  p. 10). During the drought of 1980, there was lack of sufficient 
freshwater inflow, so that shrimp moved further up estuaries, which lengthened their residency 
and increased mortality. Over time shrimp become larger (season, water temperature, shrimp 
density, salinity, size, and sex are all variables that effect growth rates) and they gradually move 
into waters with higher salinity. After shrimp reach about 4 inches in length they begin entering 
the coastal rivers. Growth continues to occur until the shrimp are ready to move into the deep 
waters of sounds, bays, and river mouths. These “lower reaches,” sometimes called staging areas, 
serve to accumulate shrimp just before they enter the ocean (SCDNR 1997). 
  
Droughts, unusually warm fall weather, and other extreme environmental conditions may cause a 
delay in the emigration of white shrimp into the ocean. Heavy rainfall and river discharge have 
been known to cause shrimp to move into the ocean prematurely because of the drop in the salt 
content of the water.  However, without significant rainfall or river discharge during the fall, 
shrimp (especially white) appear to remain in the estuaries until the water temperatures drop 
(SCDNR 1997). Shrimp movement to offshore waters may also be caused by cold, storms, high 
tides, and large influxes of fresh water, however, size is the main determinant (SAFMC 1999).  
 
Calculations of the Trade-off between Upstream and Downstream Values of  Water  
We adopt a simplified version of the theoretical framework presented in section 2, since data on 
various functional forms are not available. In essence, we make one major simplification: the 
marginal values in agriculture and fisheries do not change with the quantity of water. That is the 
 16
functions in Fig. 1 are constant functions. We will comment on this assumption below. Suppose 
the marginal value product of agriculture is $100/acre-foot.3 This may be a conservative estimate 
for the value of water in Georgia. Note that the value of water may be low for lower valued crops 
such as cotton and high for crops such as peanuts and vegetables. However, we take the low 
estimate because we are interested in finding out under what situations may water be released 
from agriculture and used for fisheries production. If low-valued agriculture has a higher benefit 
than shrimp,a model with high valued crops will give us the same result. With a value of $100 
per acre-foot, the marginal value product in gallons per day is 100/1810 = $0.06/gpd = 
$6000/million gallons per day.  
 
The annual value of shrimp catch in Georgia is $28 million. The total estuarine area in the state 
is 854 sq. miles, out of which the Ogeechee river estuary occupies about 296.16 sq miles. Thus a 
simple assumption would be to assume that the ratio of the Ogeechee estuary to the entire estuary 
area in the state is 296.16/854=0.34. Assuming a linear relationship between the areas and the 
contribution of the estuaries to the total value of fisheries, the value of catch from the Ogeechee 
estuary is expected to be (0.34)28=$9.52 million.  
 
Since we don’t know the value of the shrimp stock in the Ogeechee estuary, we take the catch to 
be 17% of the total stock. This is a conservative figure from a study that suggests the upper end 
of the estimate to be around 40 percent (Idoine, 2001) Note that taking a lower value means we 
are being conservative by tending to overestimate the value of the stock. Taking a higher figure 
(40%) will make fisheries relatively less competitive than agriculture. Then the total value of the 
stock is 9.52/0.3=$56 million. Suppose the amount of fresh water needed in the basin for shrimp 
                                                 
3 1 acre-foot equals 12 acre-inches = 325,848 gallons, equivalent to 1810 gallons per day over a six month period. 
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production is x million gallon per day (gpd). Then the value of water in shrimp is equal to 56 
million/x per million gpd. This number should be equated to the value of a million gpd of water 
in agriculture. That is, 56*106/x=6000. That is, the value of x equals 9000 mgpd. In other words, 
for the value of water to be equal between farming and shrimp production, 9,000 mgpd must be 
needed for shrimp production.  
 
We can now try to figure out the approximate flow in the Ogeechee River. Since 1 acre-ft equals 
4840*9 cubic feet = 325,848 gallons, 43,560 cubic feet = 325,848 gallons, hence 1cu.ft. = 7.48 
gallons. Thus 1 cu.ft/sec = 7.48*3600*24 = 0.6463 million gpd. The flow in the river has been 
measured at 91.3 cu ft per sec = 91.3 * 0.65 = 59.35 million gpd. The average flow at Eden, GA 
in the non-drought years from 1990 to 1998 equals 2,942 cu ft/sec which is  2,942*0.65 million 
gpd = 1,912 million gpd.  The average flow at Eden, GA in the drought years from 1999 to 2000 
= 940 cu ft/sec = 940*0.65 million gpd = 611 million gpd.   
 
Since 1,912 << 9,000, the water used in shrimp is a magnitude less than the volume at which the 
two marginal products are equated. Thus it is likely that the volume of water required for shrimp 
production is a small fraction of the water required for equalizing shadow prices. Thus if the 
demand curve for water in agriculture is downward sloping, then it is likely that for delivering 
the minimum required volume for meeting estuary requirements, only low valued uses in 
agriculture may be affected.  
 
In Figure 4 we show the relative values of water in agriculture and shrimp production. Consider 
the demand for agriculture water in a regular non-drought year, denoted by ))((1 RqD aa
− . Let the 
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demand for water in shrimp be a constant function, denoted by MBs which is the same as the 
∑MB graph of Figure 1 except that we do not consider water quality and urban use. Note that 
the intersection of the two graphs determines the allocation of water in the two uses, agriculture 
and fisheries respectively, given by )(* Rqa and )(
* Rqs . The sum of the two allocations equals 
Q , the initial endowment of water in the basin. However, in a drought year, rainfall is assumed 
to be zero, hence the demand for agriculture water shifts up to ))0((1 aa qD
−  while demand for 
shrimp remains the same. If the initial endowment remains the same, all of Q is now allocated to 
agriculture and no water is left for shrimp production. If in the drought year, Q is lower, the 
allocation is still the same and no water is used in shrimp production. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
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4. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
In this paper we develop a conceptual model of water allocation that recognizes the beneficial 
effects of maintaining water quantity and quality in the river basin on the downstream 
environment. We derive first order conditions for the above model. One insight is that 
withdrawals away from the basin always leads to an increase in pollution concentration in the 
basin, even if the pollution load in that particular use is low. The framework is then applied to 
the special case of coastal Georgia where agriculture is treated as a purely consumptive use. 
Through a simple series of computations from secondary data, we show that the value of water 
use is likely to be higher in agriculture than in the downstream externality. The water 
requirements for shrimp production are high, and the value correspondingly low. Hence from a 
policy point of view, if water allocation were to be reduced for agriculture, there needs to be a 
strong case made for increased values of the downstream externality. A higher value may need to 
be put in supporting the lifestyles of traditional fishermen, or if certain estuarine species were 
endangered, then regulation to require a minimum level of water in the estuary may draw water 
from upstream uses. Alternatively, it may be plausible to reduce lower values uses in agriculture 
and allocate a reduced volume of water for shrimp production. However, it is not clear what the 
impacts on shrimp and estuarine habitats may be, with smaller amounts of water in the basin. In 
our calculations, we assume that a given volume of water must be kept in the basin for the 
maintenance of these habitats.  
 
An important limitation of this study is the lack of availability of sound information on the 
relationship of water quantity and quality on estuarine fisheries. Further research needs to be 
done to determine some plausible functional specifications that in turn can be used for sensitivity 
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analysis with a whole range of biological and economic parameters. However, even with the very 
simple and approximate empirical techniques adopted here, it is safe to say that because of the 
relative sizes of the two industries (agriculture and fisheries), fisheries may only effectively 
compete for water with the lowest valued agriculture uses. However, these conclusions may 
change if the recreational and amenity values of the estuaries are significant, or policy makers 
put a bigger weight on the well-being of downstream populations.   
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Summary and Sources of Data Used 
 
Ogeechee surface water withdrawals and recharge: 
 
Agricultural water:  40 mgd (EPD 2001)  
 
Public water use:  46.63 mgd (Fisher etal) 
 
M&I water use:  1.28 mgd (Fisher etal) 
 
Total surface water withdrawals:  87.91 mgd 
 
Recharge water: 
 
Ag water recharge:  0 (EPD) 
 
Public water recharge:  106.26 (all public withdrawal, Fisher etal) x .547 (EPD, Reheis)4 = 
58.12422 
 
M&I water recharge:  1.28 mgd (Fisher etal) x .81.9 (USGS 1995) = 1.048 
 
Total surface water recharge:  59.17254 
 
Net water use:  28.737 mgd 
 
Salt water wedge 30-35 miles upstream in low flow conditions (EPD 2001) 
 
854 square miles of estuaries (GPPF 1999) 
 
Ogeechee marshes 237 square miles of salt marshes, 59.16 square miles of brackish marshes 
(EPD 2001) 
 
1 acre equals .0015625 square miles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 average of Chattahoochee and Flint Basins in drought years. 
8 inches in normal year (Reheis, EPD) 
6.63 inches in normal year 1995, (EPD 2001) 
17.2 inches in drought year (Reheis, EPD) 
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  Agriculture Public M & I 
 Surface Ground Well-Pond Unknown Surface Ground Unknown Surface
       
Ogeechee 904 447 106 1 5 500 2 2
    
Sources: EPD (2001), Fisher et al, (2003). 
M&I : Municipal and Industrial use 
 
Table 1.  Water Permits in the Ogeechee River Basin 
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Fig. 1     Optimal Water Allocation in normal years and during drought 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Q
sMB
$ 
1( (0))a aD q
−
aq
1( ( ))a aD q R
−
( )sq R
∗( )aq R
∗
(0)aq
∗
 26
 
 
Fig. 2. A map of Georgia’s coastal river basins  
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Figure 3. Water Usage in the Ogeechee Basin 
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Fig. 4     Allocation of Water between Agriculture and Fisheries
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